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IN ITHE. SUPREME COURT
of the

.STATE OF UTAH
HOLLIS E. WALKER,

\

Plaintiff and Resppndent, '
-vs.LEVI G. PETER.SON,

J

Case No. 8213

Defenda;nt and Appellant ..

PLAINTIF·F·'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF: FACTS·
Defendant has failed to include some facts which the
plaintiff considers important to the presentation of his
side of the case and the ref ore briefly restates the facts
in this brief.
This was an action to recover damages to plaintiff's
vehicle which arose out of an accident that occurred at an
intersection in the north city limits of Bear River City,
Utah on the 14th day of April, 1952 at about 11 :30 A.M.
The road was dry and visibility was good. (R. 4, Lines
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4, 12, 13, 18 and 20). The plaintiff was traveling south
on h'ighway 30-South (an arterial highway) approaching Bear R.iver City, Utah and had as a passenger in
his car with him his wife. The defendant had been traveling north on said highway but had stopped his car east
of the hard surface on said highway some 20 or 30 feet
south from the intersection in question for the purpose
of talking business with another party. The other party
had been driving a truck which was parked north of the
intersection and on the east side of said highway 30South. After the conversation had ended the defendant
went to his car and the third party went to his truck and
both drivers commenced to go back on the· hard surface
of the highway, the truck proceeding in a northerly direction and the defendant proceeding north for a short
distance and then making a left hand turn into the intersection to go west.
After re-entering his car defendant states that he
checked the highway for other traffic, (R. 72, Lines 2330; R. 73, Lines 1 to 3). He first saw the plaintiff's
vehicle coming from the north just after he re-entered
his car. (R. 73, Lines 4 to 9). According to Mr. Peterson,
at this time the plaintiff's vehicle was still in a 60 mile
per hour zone· (R. 73, Lines 29 and 30), and he states that
the plaintiff's car was still in that zone when the defendant pulled onto the highway. '(R. 74, Lines 1 to 4). However, an indep·endent witness, Mr. Alvin Madsen, who was
traveling behind the Walker car testified under careful
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cross-exan1ination by defendant's counsel that he first
sa\v the defendant's car moving when he, Madsen, was
about 500 to 600 feet north of the intersection (R. 39,
Lines 7 to 19), and that at this point he was traveling
at about 300 feet behind VValker (R·. 39, Lines 20 to 29),
which would thus put plaintiff 200 to 300 feet from the
intersection. The plaintiff testified that when he first
saw the defendant, defendant was coming from behind
the truck and just entering his lane of traffic (R. 58,
Lines 18 and 19) and that the small stock truck was just
entering its lane of traffic from the left side of the road.
(R. 59, Lines 1 to 14). He also testified that his estiInate would be that the distance he was away from defendant's vehicle when he first saw it was approximately
100 feet (R,. 58, Lines 4 to 7). He stated that he had time
to apply his brakes and sound his horn but no chance
to change his direction. Officer Sackett, witness for the
defendant who investigated the accident and measured
the skid marks made by the plaintiff's vehicle testified
that the plaintiff laid down 148 feet of skid marks prior
to impact. (R. 98, Lines 2, 5, 6 and 13).
The defendant testified that after he first saw the
Walker car in the 60 mile per hour zone, which was aCcording to defendant's testimony, over 127 paces away
from the center of the intersection, (R. 119, Lines 5 to
10). He did not look for the plaintiff's car again until
the plaintiff honked his' horn, at which time defendant
could see that he was going to get hit (R. 127, Lines 23
to 28). When the plaintiff honked his horn defendant
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testified that plaintiff was 150 to 200 feet fron1 the intersection (R. 120, Lines 5, 6; R. 130, Lines 3 to 5), and defendant further states that he was near the center line
of the highway when he heard the plaintiff's horn. (R.

128, Line 22 ; R. 119, Line 28).
The court found that

Mr~

Walker was exceeding

the speed limit of 60 miles per hour when he was. in the

60 mile per hour zone (although there is no evidence in
the record to support this finding) and also found that
he was traveling at a speed five miles or more in excess
of 45 miles per hour as the W a.lker car approached the
intersection, and that said speed constituted negligence,
but that the p-roximate cause of the accident was the
defendant's negligence in making a left turn on a through
highway and his failure to keep a p-roper lookout. (R. 131,
Lines 1 to 26).

STATEMENT OF POIN'TS
POIN'T NO. I.
WHETHER THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN FAILING
TO FIND THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO KEEP A PROPER
LOOKOUT.

POINT NO. II.
WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGEN·CE, AS
FOUND BY THE COURT, IN DRIVING AT A SPEED IN
EXCESS OF THE POSTED SPEED, DID AS A MATTER OF
LAW PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTE TO THE ACCIDENT.
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ARGUMENT
POIN'T NO. I.
WHETHER THE COURT WAS IN ERROR IN FAILING
TO FIND THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO KEEP A PROPER
LOOKOUT.

Plaintiff's testimony that he did not see the Peterson car until he was 100 feet away conflicts with the
graphic evidence laid down by the plaintiff's car by way
of skid marks to the extent of 148 feet prior to the point
of impact. Obviously plaintiff made an incorrect estimate
of the distance when he stated he first saw defendant's
car 100 feet away. The plaintiff testified that he saw
the defendant's car as it pulled out from behind the truck
and that he honked his horn and applied his brakes when
he saw the defendant's vehicle start to cross the highway.
The defendant testifed that when he heard the plaintiff's horn the plaintiff was in the neighborhood of 200
feet north of the intersection and it would appear, using
the brake marks of 148 feet and the reaction time of three
fourths of a second prior to the application of brakes and
while the plaintiff was traveling at approximately 45
miles per hour (which the court found the plaintiff was
traveling) 200 feet would be closer to the distance that the
plaintiff first noticed the danger created by the defendant's automobile. Both the plaintiff and the independent
witness, Mr. Madsen, testified that the defendant's car
came from behind the truck and made the left turn.
The truck apparently obscured plaintiff's vision of deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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fendant's vehicle for part of the tilne. Certainly under
the evidence presented it was a question of fact for the
court to detern1ine whether or not the plaintiff failed
to keep a proper lookout and there was sufficient evidence that the plaintiff \vas keeping a proper lookout.
POINT NO. II.
WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF'S NEGLIGEN·CE, AS
FOUND BY THE COURT, IN DRIVING AT A SPEED IN
EXCESS OF 'THE POSTED SPEED, DID AS A MATTER OF
LAW PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTE TO THE ACCIDENT.

Counsel for defendant wants the court to decide
that the sole proximate cause of this accident was not the
improper left hand turn of the defendant and his failure
to keep a p,roper lookout. He contends that the plaintiff,
whom the court found was traveling in excess of the
posted speed limit as he approached the intersection
was guilty of contributory negligence. This is a question
of fact to be decided by the court sitting as trier of the
facts. See 5 American J ur ., page 882, Sec. 689, where it is
said:
"It is generally for the jury to decide whether
the speed of the vehicle proximately contributed
to the accident and whether such speed was excessive considering in connection therewith the hazards of the surrounding circumstances."
See also: 10 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile
Law and Practice, Part I, page 662, Section 6607 where
it is said:
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"Speed in excess of that permitted by statute,
ordinance or other traffic regulation may constitute negligence per se. Nevertheless, there is still
a jury question as to whether or not such violation
\Vas the proximate cause of the injury or damage
complained of."
The case of Yeates v. Bu..dge, decided by this court
J'anuary 1~, 1953, 252 Pac. (2nd) 220 raises the very
point in question here. In that case, in which the defendant \vas n1aking a left turn at an intersection, the trial
court found that the plaintiff traveling in the opposite
direction fro1n the defendant was driving too fast for
existing conditions, but decided, nevertheless, that the
sole and proxi1nate cause of the accident was the left turn
of the defendant without signal and when the plaintiff
\Vas so close as to constitute an immediate hazard. Our
Supreme Court in that matter referred to the case of
Cederloff v. Whited cited in the appellant's brief but
stated that it did not need to go to the extent of the holding in the Cederlof case since the Cederlof case was decided as n1atter of law whereas in the Y ea,tes v. Budge
case the trial court (the fact finder) found Mrs. Y eate's
negligence to be the sole proximate cause of the accident.
Such is the case in the rna tter now hef ore this court.
The court was clearly correct in finding that the proxiInate cause of the accident was the improper left turn of
the defendant and that plaintiff's speed was not contributory negligence. If defendant had exercised the care
required of a reasonably prudent man he would have
checked the progress of the Walker vehicle prior to cross-
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ing into the south bound lane of traffic. Had the defendant taken the time to make an estimate of the plaintiff's
speed, he would have ascertained \vithout the slighte~t
trouble that at plaintiff's speed it was not sa.fp or prudent
to pToceed into the south bound lane of traffic. '11lH_) dPfendant cannot complain that he "\Vas 1nislead or lulled into a false sense of security by pla:intiff's speed or distance
from the intersection because defendant never seriously
took pains to calculate either. There is a conflict in the
evidence as to the respective location of the tw'o vehicles
at any particular time but there is sufficient evidence so
that the trial court could find that the plaintiff's vehicle
was so close to the intersection as to cause it to be an
immediate hazard to the defendant's vehicle at the time
it was making a left turn and this could be true even had
the plaintiff been traveling at 40 miles per hour, the
posted speed limit. The front of plaintiff's vehicle struck
the right front of defendant's car, headlight and right
front wheel. If the plaintiff had been traveling a little
slower he would have perhaps struck the car in the n1iddle
or a little toward the hack.
Defendant's counsel has gone into detail and discussed many of the Utah left turn cases. However, each
of these cases was decided upon the individual facts and
circumstances of the case. For the most part the facts
in each case have been set out in appellant's brief..A.
reading of the cases cited by the appellant's counsel clearly indicates the th-oughts and holding of the Utah SuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pre1ne Court on cases involving left hand turns. In

Ccderloff v. Whited,, 169 Pac. (2nd) 777, 778, the
Court says:
"Had plaintiff's car run into the rear end of
defendant's car after the front end thereof had
entirely crossed plaintiff's course of travel there
might have been some question whether the turn
could be 1nade with reasonable safety.... "
In the present case, plaintiff struck the right front of
defendant's car, headlight and right front wheel. (R.
6, Lines 29 and 30, R. 7, Lines 1 and 2). In Hart v. Kerr,
175 Pac. (2nd) 475, 477, Mr. Justice Pratt says:
"There seems to be rather an obvious conclusion at which to arrive from the evidence; plaintiff knew the defendant was coming fast .... "
IIere the defendant knew or ought to have known that
plaintiff was coming fast,
" . . . and plaintiff's automobile was hit in
front of its center ... The conclusion: Plaintiff
took a chance upon a faulty estimate of distance
and speed, and lost."
Isn't that what this defendant did~ He made a faulty
esti1nate of distance and con1pletely neglected his duty
to 1nake any esti1nate of plaintiff's speed. In Hickok v.
Skinner, 190 Pac. (2nd) 512, plaintiff is non-suited. The
court by ~fr. Justice Latimer remarked:
''Plaintiff made no effort to estimate the
speed of the approaching vehicle."
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Again at page 516 plaintiff is rapped by the Court.
"For his prolonged inattention to the traffic
that was approaching west on 21st South."
"He testified that having once seen defendant's automobile approaching the intersection, 400
to 500 feet to the east, he started his car forward
from a point 20 feet back from the intersection,
drove into and almost across the intersection or a
distance of 65 feet without ever looking again in
the direction from \vhich defendant's car was approaching."
For his failure to estimate the speed of the approaching
vehicle, for his failure to look again, the court found
that he "failed to act in prudent and careful manner."
But, it is in French v. Utah Oil Refining Company, 216
Pac. (2nd) 1002 that we find some of the clearest language in support of plaintiff's case. In this case plaintiff was driving north on 2nd West in Salt Lake City,
Utah. Defendant's truck and trailer was going south on
the west lane of traffic. Plaintiff made a left turn at
4th South and was hit by the d€fendant in the right front
fender. At the time of making the left hand turn plaintiff was going 8 m.p.h. and the defendant \vas about 120
feet away traveling 20 or 25 m.p.h. At this point plaintiff
was son1ewhere in the intersection. The Court said at
page 1003:
"In giving the plaintiff the benefit of the evidence more favorable to him, we conclude that at
the time he en t.ered the intersection and in tended
to make his turn to the left, defendant's truck was
not in the intersection. However, we are forced to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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conclude that regardless of the variation in the
stories of plaintiff as to the relative location of
the vehicles the evidence conclusively establishes
that the truck was so close to the intersection at
the tin1e plaintiff intended to and did turn west
as to constitute an immediate hazard."
and at page 1004 :
"'When a statute prescribes that a turning
vehicle 1nust yield the right of way when the latter
is close enough to constitute a hazard it anticipates the exercise of reasonable judgment, on the
part of the driver turning. I-Iowever, a burden is
placed on the driver making the turn as he has
control of the situation, and if there is a reasonable probability that the movement cannot be
1nade in safety, then the disfavored driver should
yield. The driver proceeding straight ahead has
little opportunity to know a vehicle is to he turned
across his path until the movement is commenced
and in many instances, the warning is too late for
the latter driver to take effective action."
It is therefore readily apparent that each case cited by
plaintiff and defendant was determined on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each accident.
No court can lay down a rule to indicate what is so close
as to constitute an immediate hazard. ·This is a question
of fact. Just as whether or not the speed of the vehicle
did or did not contribute to an accident. We have simply
tried to point out in this brief that the court in this case
\\"as fully justified in finding that the sole and proiXimate
cause of the accident was the defendant's improper left
hand turn. Section -!1-6-73, U.C.A. 1953 says:
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"The driver of a vehicle w·ithin an intersection
intending to turn to the left shall yield the right
of way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction which is within the intersection or so
close thereto as to constitu-te an immediate hazard,
but said driver, having so yielded and having
given a signal when and as required by this act,
may make such left turn and the drivers of all
other vehicles approaching the intersection from
said opposite direction shall yield the right of way
to the vehicle n1aking the left turn."
Here the plaintiff was approaching the intersection rapidly and had the defendant exercised even the simplest
measure of precaution, had he attempted to make even
a superficial appraisal of the relative position of the
plaintiff's car to his own, he would never have attempted
the maneuver which caused this accident.
This is true even though the plaintiff had been
traveling at 40 m.p.h. That even at 40 m.p.h. defendant
turned so close that it was impossible for plaintiff to
successfully stop his vehicle to avoid the accident. Thus,
if plaintiff could not stop at 40 m.p.h. in time to keep
from hitting the defendant's car, he eannot be accused of
contributory negligence because he was slightly exceeding
40 miles per hour as he approached the intersection. Defendant was not in any way mislead by plaintiff's excessive speed.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion we submit that there are ample facts
to support the trial court's finding that defendant's
negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the accident and that there "\Vas no error in the judgment made
and entered by the lower court ·and that the same should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RICH & STR.ONG,
WILLIAM S. FRANK, and
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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